News

Where Angel didn’t fear to tread

Author: Michael Goldhaber

Published: 11/10/2007 00:04

Email article | Comment on this article | Sign up to News Alerts

 

For a generation, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom stood alone globally among law firms in combining mammoth size with regal wealth. Well, move over, Joe Flom. With revenue of £1.121bn and profits per equity partner of £1.294m, Linklaters has surpassed Skadden on both measures. As managing partner Tony Angel’s nine-year tenure draws to a close, Linklaters is both big and rich.

“The elite New York firms used to say that the big UK firms are so big that they cannot get their profits up,” says Tony Williams of consultancy Jomati. “Well, they can and they have.”

Linklaters’ wealth is no illusion, although there is room for quibbling. That headline-making profit number of £1.294m is seen by only 280 full-equity partners. Throw in 145 ‘reduced-equity’ partners in lower-earning jurisdictions, toss in another 84 non-equity partners, and average compensation for all partners comes to around £1.02m. On that measure Linklaters falls a notch below Skadden and Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton — but still a shade above Davis Polk & Wardwell and Debevoise & Plimpton. That is fine company. And, however you slice them, Linklaters has boosted total profits by a mind-blowing 108% in three years.

Angel took Linklaters to the super-league in profits by pursuing the holy grail of law firm management: globalisation. In his first term as managing partner, he acquired a raft of foreign offices (not all of them well-chosen). He then pulled off the real trick. In his second term, Angel transformed a firm that was global by virtue of having a lot of offices into a law firm that is global by virtue of doing global work for global clients. And he did it the hard way: by managing.

The success of Angel’s strategy is only apparent in retrospect. He became a tax partner in City grandee Linklaters & Paines in 1984. In 1986 he campaigned for the management committee, and at 33 he became the youngest member in its history. Ten years later, Angel wrote the white paper on globalisation that became the blueprint for the law firm’s expansion. In 1998 Linklaters formed a federation with a group of continental firms known as The Alliance of European Lawyers. The firm’s then managing partner, Terence Kyle, stepped up to supervise the short-lived federation called Linklaters & Alliance, while Angel took on the more lasting role of managing Linklaters proper. Angel’s reputation as a tax lawyer was such that his main rival, Steve Edge of Slaughter and May, wrote Linklaters a letter of thanks for promoting Angel out of the practise of law.

Angel might have been prescient on globalisation, but the Alliance proved fragile. In 2001 Linklaters merged fully with only three of the alliance’s member firms: Oppenhoff & Raedler in Germany, Lagerlof & Leman in Sweden, and De Bandt van Hecke Lagae & Loesch in Belgium. The four strongest firms in The Alliance of European Lawyers fell by the wayside. France’s Jeantet & Associes and Spain’s Uria Menendez declined to even join Linklaters’ federation. Gianni Origoni Grippo & Partners in Italy and De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek in the Netherlands withdrew when Linklaters pushed for full mergers with its allies.

Most of Angel’s first term as managing partner was spent digesting what the firm had eaten. Although Germany stayed in the fold, it was the source of angst for Angel and schadenfreude for his foes. About 35 of 110 Oppenhoff partners left at the altar. Since then about 25 more have left, leaving less than half the original partnership. Given Linklaters’ surprise decision to close its Cologne office — which was originally one of the strongest proponents of merging with the UK firm — to launch a Duesseldorf practice, there will be plenty more departures.

The shell of Oppenhoff excels in finance but lacks a German corporate client base, in contrast to the German partners of Clifford Chance (CC) and Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer. As a result, Linklaters has yet to raise Germany to the level of the firm’s profitability; indeed, many think that the continued problems with the German practice are one of the firm’s few obvious weak links.

“Tony will maintain to his dying day that Germany will get on full equity,” says a former partner, “but it has not happened yet.”

At the end of Angel’s first term as managing partner, in 2003, the firm’s profits stagnated, and Angel was widely demonised. But he persuaded his partners to keep faith in his global vision and to continue investing, spending £25m on a new computer system at the firm’s lowest point. Angel laid out a new three-year plan. He aimed to focus the firm on premium cross-border work, to add financial clients to the firm’s traditional corporate base, and to defenestrate any partners with a competing agenda. Oh, and by the way, to build a New York office. It is a strategy widely touted but rarely well-executed.

To an astonishing degree, Angel has reoriented the firm around cross-border work. Three years ago, he began to track the proportion of billings involving more than one country and asked each practice to set ambitious moving goals. On his computer dashboard Angel tracks the firm’s performance, on a rolling annual basis, on this and other nifty metrics. If the firm is moving in the right direction on a given measure, and meeting its current target, an arrow on Angel’s screen points up, and a light glows green. Since he began tracking the proportion of billings involving more than one country, that number has jumped from 30% to two-thirds. Now Angel is asking his practice heads to meet ambitious moving targets for billings to the firm’s 40-odd biggest clients, and another 40-plus preferred global clients. Currently, these clients account for 52% of firm billings. The dashboard arrow for that statistic is pointing up, the gauge is glowing green, and the face reflected in the computer screen is smiling.

More global, Angel has found, means more profitable. For every extra office involved, the effective billing rate rises, because clients demand fewer discounts and agree to more premium fees for cross-border deals. “Number of offices,” he explains, “is a proxy for complexity.”

Global banks are very much on Linklaters’ target client list. At the start of Angel’s term, Linklaters set out to break the financial duopoly of CC and Allen & Overy, and to a considerable extent, it has succeeded. Overall, financial institutions accounted last year for 15 of Linklaters’ top 20 clients. Since 1999 the share of firm revenue derived from financial clients, defined to include private equity and hedge funds, has skyrocketed from 27% to 46%. And in the past four years, the finance division (including capital markets and insolvency) has pushed its share of firm revenues from 30% to 35%. The corporate division has consistently generated 40% of the pie.

The popular impression in London is that Linklaters cut real estate and litigation, but that is misleading. Despite partner losses, the litigation group remained stable, the real estate group grew, and both became more profitable.

“Real estate has been transformed,” says commercial division head John Turnbull, “into a finance practice where property happens to be the underlying asset.”

A finer finance department serves to stabilise a firm whose historical core is M&A. “If a real downturn sets in, then we have got a fantastic insolvency practice,” says finance head John Tucker, who has just taken on overall responsibility for Linklaters’ much-touted US practice.

Those partners who do not serve the lucrative cross-border needs of priority clients are secondary. Last year intellectual property was the only firm practice with profits of more than 15% below average, because it was dragged down by the German trademark group, Auf Wiedersehen, German trademark filers. Overall, 125 partners have left or retired in the last four years.

Angel worries about losing lawyers only if they are highly appraised by the measures he has refined. In appraising partners financially, he focuses on the ‘gross margin per partner standard hour’. This number subtracts each partner’s share of salary and overheads from the profit that he or she generates. Think of it as a sort of magic circle sweet spot.

Angel’s passion for management sets the tone firm-wide. He relies on a large team of non-lawyer managers, including 14 on the firm’s ‘strategy team’, several recruited from elite consultancies and paid on a profit basis. Last year Linklaters devoted 22,000 lawyer hours to training. In the past three years it sent 300 partners on a crash course designed for the firm by Harvard Business School.

Angel finds it ironic that the US as the nation with the world’s best business schools has so little regard for law firm management. “We have come to see that real management is phenomenally valuable,” he says. “US firms still confuse management and bureaucracy.”

Angel is bemused when US firms boast that their managers have time to practice. “People thought I was a pretty good tax lawyer,” says Angel. “But I hope they also see that I contributed far more as a manager than I could ever have contributed as a tax lawyer. I do not think lawyers in the US understand that yet.”

However lightly managed by comparison, US firms remain pesky rivals, and the jury is out on Angel’s US strategy. A US corporate base is needed if Linklaters is ever to pass Skadden and Sullivan & Cromwell in the global merger league tables. But no US firm seems eager to be swallowed by a British behemoth after CC botched the absorption of Rogers & Wells. Although Linklaters remains open to a US merger, it resolved in 2003 that it could not count on one and needed to build an office from the ground up.

It is not an easy task, for, despite Linklaters’ new wealth, the lateral maths is tricky for recruiting in New York. Linklaters has a 10-year lockstep that is compressed by the standard of US remuneration. Plateau partners make 2.5 times the level of a first-year partner. In the firm’s latest financial year, pay ranges from £647,000 to £1.618m.

At US firms, the spread is typically higher. At Skadden, the ratio is 4:1, placing last year’s range at an estimated $1.05m-$4.2m (£510,000-£2.06m). US firms with no lockstep will pay stars more than $5m (£2.45m). Thus, Linklaters pays top-of-the-market for young partners, but struggles to attract older lawyers from US lockstep firms, or stars from eat-what-you-kill firms. In addition, some New York firms promise generous (some would say reckless) pension benefits; Cravath Swaine & Moore’s has been reported to be in excess of half a million dollars per year. Linklaters bids farewell to its retirees with one lump-sum payment, currently in the region of £600,000.

Linklaters’ US senior partner, Paul Wickes, is undeterred. “There are a number of partners at US firms whose compensation is such that we do not make sense for them,” he says. “That number is small and shrinking. But our approach is not to wait for a 55-year-old big hitter, or to wait for a merger. We are hiring a bunch of young, talented people who we can plug into our firm network.” Whether this approach can build a domestic corporate practice is questionable. But to US lawyers with a global mind-set, that network is enticing.

The New York office has tripled in three years to 130 lawyers, with a mix of litigation and finance lawyers from firms such as White & Case, Shearman & Sterling and Latham & Watkins. Still expanding, with six lateral partners hired in the past year, the branch falls short of firm-wide profitability, while paying partners a full share of equity.

It is an office mature enough that Linklaters was able to keep some of the US work for three of this year’s mega-mergers: advising Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) on its bid for ABN Amro; Rio Tinto on its bid for Alcan; and UBS on the financing for Enel’s deal with Endesa. But RBS still needed to assign much of its US work to Shearman. And, as in Germany, native corporate clients remain a long-term dream.

Angel’s critics say that the Alliance and the mergers it prefaced were a big waste of effort. “The profit story is driven by the core London practice,” says a former partner, “which would have been there anyway.” Angel argues that this critique misunderstands the nature of the beast. In today’s Linklaters even the mighty London office depends for its might on the global network of 30 branches in 23 nations.

One notable critic complains that Linklaters stifles creativity by relying on its database of precedents and armies of junior lawyers. “It is the difference between pret-a-porter and tailor-made craftsmanship,” says Hans Rolf Koerfer, now head of global M&A at Shearman, who left Oppenhoff & Raedler in 2000 on the eve of its merger with Linklaters, which he negotiated.

“I love my profession, and I need intellectual stimulation,” he says. “If it is just to make money, I could run a variety of other businesses and make more money.” Koerfer claims that morale at Linklaters is “miserable”.

To Koerfer’s comment on the firm’s quality, Angel retorts that clients are not complaining. It is also true that the firm is regarded as having considerably improved its record on staff engagement in London at least, where the firm has built a reputation as a progressive employer.

If today’s Linklaters partners are disgruntled, they are not voting with their feet. One needs to go back three years to find a clutch of prominent lawyers who left by choice. Since May 2004 Linklaters has stolen 13 partners from other magic circle firms, while losing only one in return. The Linklaters partnership certainly grew during its years of fratricide, thanks to 46 lateral hires and 114 promotions over four years.

By far the most common complaint among Linklaters’ refugees is that they lost all autonomy in practice development. David Aknin is a private equity star in Paris who left in 2003 for Weil Gotshal & Manges. “What is really important,” he says, “is that you feel a bond with your partners, and not like an employee of a corporation. Tony Angel is a great manager, and Linklaters is a true success, but it is not to the taste of everyone.”

If making tough choices among clients restored Linklaters to the top, Angel offers no apologies. He seems glad to see the back of lawyers who give priority to their own fancies. “Strategy is not saying yes to everything,” he says. “Strategy means saying no. If we are going to be a global law firm, there are some things that we must stop doing.”

At the end of Angel’s tenure, Linklaters is awash in acclaim. For the past two years, it has been rated by lawyers as the UK’s best-managed law firm in Legal Week surveys and has continually been lauded for its excellent financial performance, which has seen it pull ahead of its global magic circle rivals.

On 1 January, Angel will leave to his successor a well-balanced firm, if perhaps a weary one. “Tony’s vision and strategy and tenacity about strategy has been the thing that has kept us on the right road,” says Turnbull. “He took a lot of criticism, but he has seen it through to success.”

The man selected by Linklaters’ supervisory board to replace Angel stands for a continuation of his policies. Angel groomed Simon Davies as a leader at a young age by appointing him Asia managing partner. During four years in that role, Davies boosted training, slashed attrition, bagged a number of laterals, and, in 2005, pulled off a merger with Mitsuhiro Yasuda and Akihiro Wani in Japan. Davies raised Asia’s share of firm revenue to 10% and, in a region where many would be happy just to break even, elevated each office’s profitability above Linklaters’ lofty average. A 40-year-old newlywed, Davies has boyish, even-set features. His agenda, he says, is to complete what Angel has begun. That may mean that finance continues to edge up in its share of revenues. But it also means that the firm needs to add German, American, and Asian corporate clients to its base, as it has already added India’s Reliance Industries and Russia’s Gazprom to key UK clients such as BP and Vodafone.

So how will the new Linklaters differ from the old? Davies chooses his words carefully, to cushion any implicit criticism. “More emphasis,” he says “needs to go into firm culture.” Davies favours more consistent firm-wide support of childcare. He also supports flexible work arrangements, and greater diversity in hiring and promotion. Davies’ argument for improved diversity and quality of life are both moral and pragmatic. “We need to strengthen the culture,” he says, “so we are not just relying on economic bonds when we hit a downturn.”

Can Linklaters sustain the financial strength that it has achieved through management? Both Angel and Davies believe that the long run favours the magic circle firm against its key global rivals because the process of globalisation will only deepen. If they are right, the law firm managers of the future may wish to enroll in Harvard Business School. And they may just find themselves learning from a case study of Linklaters under Angel.

A version of this article first appeared in the October edition of The American Lawyer, Legal Week’s US sister title.

More news, deals and comment on Linklaters

Linklaters on the Legal Week Wiki

More news, deals and comment on Linklaters

Advanced Search

Log on | Register

Job of the Week

In-House Corporate Lawyer, Aviva

Job Alerts

British Legal Awards 2008

Current Issue

3 July 2008

The pay review led to furious senior associates Recent updates include DLA Piper, Linklaters, BLP, Dewey and Herbert Smith